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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal presents a question of statutory 
interpretation involving adjacent subsections of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et 
seq.: Does the conferral of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) 
under § 1254a constitute an “admission” into the United States 
under § 1255? We hold it does not.  
I 
 Jose Sanchez and Sonia Gonzalez (Plaintiffs or 
Appellees) are husband and wife and citizens of El Salvador. 
They entered the United States without inspection or admission 
in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes 
in El Salvador in 2001, Plaintiffs applied for and received TPS. 
Over the next several years, the Attorney General1 periodically 
 
1 Although §§ 1254a and 1255 reference the Attorney 
General’s authority and discretion in managing the TPS 
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extended TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals, which 
enabled Plaintiffs to remain in the United States. 
In 2014, Plaintiffs applied to become lawful permanent 
residents under § 1255. The United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, 
explaining that Sanchez was “statutorily ineligible” for 
adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the 
United States. And USCIS denied Gonzalez’s application 
because it depended on the success of Sanchez’s application. 
Plaintiffs challenged that decision in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing Sanchez 
was “admitted” into the United States when he received TPS. 
Sanchez v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6427894, at *4 (D.N.J. 2018). 
The District Court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment, 
holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255(a)’s requirement that an 
alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible 
for adjustment of status. Id. at *5–6. The Court reasoned that 
being considered in “lawful status” is “wholly consistent with 
being considered as though Plaintiffs had been ‘inspected and 
admitted’ under § 1255.” Id. at *4. The Government filed this 
timely appeal.2 
 
program, this authority now belongs to the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security. See Mejia Rodriguez v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d 1137, 1140 n.3 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) & 8 C.F.R. § 244.2). 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 
review the summary judgment de novo, applying the same 




 TPS shields foreign nationals present in the United 
States from removal during armed conflict, environmental 
disasters, or other extraordinary conditions in their homelands. 
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). Once TPS is granted, “the alien shall 
be considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a 
nonimmigrant” for adjustment-of-status purposes under 
§ 1255. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4) (emphasis added). 
Section 1255(a) permits certain aliens present in the 
United States (including some who received TPS) to adjust 
their status. It provides:  
The status of an alien who was inspected and 
admitted or paroled into the United 
States . . . may be adjusted by the Attorney 
General, in his discretion and under such 
regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.  
 
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (emphasis added). The INA defines 
“admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien 
 
Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2016). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no 
genuine dispute over any material fact, so we review only the 
District Court’s legal interpretation of §§ 1254a and 1255. 
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into the United States after inspection and authorization by an 
immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). 
As relevant here, an applicant is ineligible for 
adjustment of status under § 1255 if he “has failed (other than 
through no fault of his own or for technical reasons) to 
maintain continuously a lawful status since entry into the 
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2). An applicant may 
nevertheless seek adjustment of status despite that bar if “the 
alien, on the date of filing an application for adjustment of 
status, is present in the United States pursuant to a lawful 
admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(k)(1) (emphasis added).  
III 
Appellees claim they are eligible for adjustment of 
status because they were admitted when they received TPS. We 
disagree because their interpretation of §§ 1254a and 1255 is 
inconsistent with the text, context, structure, and purpose of 
those sections. 
A 
 The text of §§ 1254a and 1255 supports our 
determination that a grant of TPS does not constitute an 
admission. 
The Government argues the District Court erred when it 
held that “being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a 
nonimmigrant” includes being “inspected and admitted or 
paroled” as required by § 1255(a). According to the 
Government, “lawful status” does not qualify as an 
“admission” because the concepts are distinct. Appellees agree 
that these terms have distinct meanings, so they do not argue 
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that “being in any lawful status is equivalent to an admission.” 
Sanchez Br. 8. Instead, they insist “that the process of obtaining 
TPS constitutes an admission, akin to an alien who is 
considered admitted after an adjustment of status.” Id. (citing 
In re Espinosa-Guillot, 25 I. & N. Dec. 653, 654 (BIA 2011) 
(“An adjustment of status generally constitutes an 
admission.”)). Appellees contend “[a]n individual’s original 
entry is irrelevant because the subsequent grant of 
TPS . . . provides the ‘lawful entry’ referred to in 
§ 1101(a)(13).” Id. at 15. And they emphasize that obtaining 
nonimmigrant status requires the admission of the alien, so the 
government admits TPS recipients by treating them as being in 
lawful nonimmigrant status under § 1254a(f)(4). 
 The Government’s position is more consistent with the 
text of §§ 1254a and 1255. The INA defines “admission” and 
“admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United 
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration 
officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). We have interpreted 
“admission” in § 1255(b) in accordance with that statutory 
definition. Hanif v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 
2012). And although “lawful status” is not defined in the INA, 
we have drawn a clear line between “admission” and “status,” 
saying “[t]he date of gaining a new status is not the same as the 
date of the physical event of entering the country.” Id.; see also 
Taveras v. Att’y Gen., 731 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The 
words ‘entry’ and ‘into’ plainly indicate that ‘admission’ 
involves physical entrance into the country, which is inapposite 
to adjustment of status in removal proceedings, a procedure 
that is structured to take place entirely within the United 
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States.”). Nothing in §§ 1254a or 1255 suggests we should 
interpret these terms differently now.3 
Appellees principally argue that “[b]y the very nature of 
obtaining lawful nonimmigrant status, the alien goes through 
inspection and is deemed admitted.” Sanchez Br. 8 (quoting 
Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). This assertion is unpersuasive for 
at least three reasons.  
First, the text of § 1254a does not mention that a grant 
of TPS is (or should be considered) an inspection and 
admission. Second, a grant of TPS cannot be an “admission” 
because § 1254a requires an alien to be present in the United 
States to be eligible for TPS. Consistent with that fact, we have 
 
3 The Fifth Circuit also has recognized the distinction 
between admission and status: 
 
Admission and status are fundamentally distinct 
concepts. Admission is an occurrence, defined in 
wholly factual and procedural terms: An 
individual who presents himself at an 
immigration checkpoint, undergoes a 
procedurally regular inspection, and is given 
permission to enter has been admitted, regardless 
of whether he had any underlying legal right to 
do so. Status, by contrast, usually describes the 
type of permission to be present in the United 
States that an individual has. 
 





recognized that TPS is not “a program of entry for an alien.” 
De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 353–54 (3d Cir. 
2010). Third, although Appellees are correct that admission 
often accompanies a grant of lawful status, it does not follow 
that a grant of lawful status is an admission. For example, “a 
grant of asylum places the individual in valid immigration 
status but is not an ‘admission.’” In re H-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
617, 635 (AAO 2019) (citing In re V-X-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 147 
(BIA 2013)). “And a grant of benefits under the Family Unity 
Program confers a ‘status’ for immigration purposes, but does 
not constitute an ‘admission.’” Id. (quoting In re Fajardo 
Espinoza, 26 I. & N. Dec. 603, 605 (BIA 2015)).4 
 
4 Although we owe no deference to the agency’s 
interpretation of these statutes, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) General Counsel issued an 
opinion just one year after Congress enacted the TPS statute 
endorsing the Government’s view. Temporary Protected Status 
and Eligibility for Adjustment of Status under Section [1255], 
INS Gen. Counsel Op. No. 91-27, 1991 WL 1185138 (Mar. 4, 
1991) (1991 Opinion), incorporated at 7 USCIS Policy 
Manual B.2(A)(5), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual 
(advising that a grant of TPS should not be construed as an 
admission into the United States). And when the INS 
promulgated regulations later that year, it declined to adopt a 
proposal that would have allowed TPS recipients to adjust their 
status no matter how they entered the United States. See In re 
H-G-G-, 27 I. & N. at 621. These agency actions suggest 






 The statutory context and structure also support our 
holding that a grant of TPS does not constitute an admission. 
Congress created an exception to the admission 
requirement for some aliens but did not do so for TPS 
recipients. Instead, it said that an alien with TPS “shall be 
considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a 
nonimmigrant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4). It did not say the alien 
would also be considered “inspected and admitted or paroled,” 
which is the first requirement for adjustment of status under 
§ 1255(a). But Congress did provide an exception to the 
“inspected and admitted or paroled” requirement for “special 
immigrants” described by § 1101(a)(27)(J) and aliens eligible 
for a visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h), (i). Unlike special 
immigrants and aliens eligible for a visa, TPS recipients were 
not excepted from the admission requirement because “where 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
The interpretation Appellees propose also risks 
rendering part of § 1254a superfluous. Section 1254a(h) 
enables Congress to pass special legislation adjusting the status 
of aliens receiving TPS only by a supermajority of the Senate. 
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(h)(2). Reading § 1254a(f)(4) to place aliens 
effectively in lawful status and to satisfy § 1255’s threshold 
requirement would pave a clear path to status adjustment for 
TPS recipients in derogation of § 1254a(h)(2)’s supermajority 
requirement. We doubt Congress intended that. See Hibbs v. 
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Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“A statute should be construed 
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Other subsections in § 1255 refer to admission and 
lawful status as distinct concepts, further highlighting the 
independent significance of both. For example, § 1255(k) says 
an alien is eligible for adjustment of status if “subsequent to 
such lawful admission [the alien] has not . . . failed to 
maintain, continuously, a lawful status.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(k)(2)(A) (emphasis added). And § 1255(m)(1) 
provides: “The Secretary of Homeland Security may adjust the 
status of an alien admitted into the United States (or otherwise 
provided nonimmigrant status).” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(1) 
(emphasis added). 
Beyond the textual differences between the sections, the 
structure of § 1255 also supports our opinion that 
§§ 1254a(f)(4) and 1255(a) refer to different requirements. If 
being considered in lawful nonimmigrant status was the same 
as being inspected and admitted or paroled, there would be no 
need for § 1255 to list inspection and admission or parole as a 
threshold requirement in § 1255(a) and failure to maintain 
lawful status as a bar to eligibility for adjustment of status in 
§ 1255(c)(2). Under Appellees’ theory, anyone who is 
considered in lawful status would be able to satisfy § 1255(a)’s 
admission requirement, thus rendering the two provisions 
superfluous. 
C 
Finally, Appellees’ interpretation would undermine the 
purpose of the TPS statute. As we have held, “[b]y the terms of 
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the statute, the TPS program was designed to shield aliens 
already in the country from removal when a natural disaster or 
similar occurrence has rendered removal unsafe.” De Leon-
Ochoa, 622 F.3d at 353. As its name suggests, this protection 
is meant to be temporary. Treating a grant of TPS as an 
admission would open the door to more permanent status 
adjustments that Congress did not intend.  
IV 
 The District Court did not read the INA in the manner 
we just described. Instead, it cited Flores v. USCIS, 718 F.3d 
548 (6th Cir. 2013), and Ramirez v. Brown, 852 F.3d 954 (9th 
Cir. 2017), to support its conclusion that a grant of TPS 
constitutes an admission. We respectfully disagree with those 
opinions. 
A 
 The petitioner in Flores, Saady Suazo, entered the 
United States without inspection or admission in 1998. 718 
F.3d at 550. The Attorney General granted Suazo TPS in 1999 
and he remained in the United States for the next fifteen years. 
Id. at 549–50. After marrying an American citizen, Suazo 
sought adjustment of status through an “Immediate Relative 
Petition.” Id. at 550. The USCIS denied his petition because he 
entered the United States without inspection. Id. Suazo was 
also unsuccessful in the district court, which held the plain 
language of § 1255 “precludes a TPS beneficiary who was not 
initially ‘inspected and admitted or paroled’ into the United 
States . . . from adjusting his status.” Id. at 550–51. 
 On appeal, Suazo argued the plain language of § 1255 
“shows that Congress’s clear intent was that a TPS beneficiary 
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is afforded with a pathway to [Lawful Permanent Resident] 
status.” Id. at 552. Although he conceded that an alien must be 
“admitted” to be eligible for adjustment of status, Suazo argued 
“TPS beneficiaries are afforded with an exception under the 
TPS statute which operates as an inadmissibility waiver.” Id. 
The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding the text of §§ 1254a and 
1255 suggests TPS functions as an inspection and admission 
for aliens who entered the country illegally. Id. at 551–54.  
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit purported to follow the 
plain language of §§ 1254a and 1255. Id. at 553. It reasoned 
that to have lawful status as a nonimmigrant under § 1255, an 
alien must also be considered admitted. Id. It took 
§ 1254a(f)(4)’s statement about status and applied it to all of 
§ 1255, including the admission requirement. Id. The court 
also considered “the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. It noted 
that although the Attorney General has discretion to waive 
certain grounds of inadmissibility for groups of aliens, § 1254a 
also explicitly limits the Attorney General’s discretion as to 
particular groups. Id. TPS recipients are not included in the 
groups of aliens prohibited from discretionary relief, so the 
court reasoned that “Congress did not intend to strip the 
Attorney General of discretion to waive admissibility 
requirements for all TPS beneficiaries.” Id. at 554. Moreover, 
the court took TPS recipients’ absence from a list of “[c]lasses 
of aliens ineligible for visas or admission” as further proof that 
they are eligible for adjustment of status, regardless of whether 
they were admitted when they entered the United States. Id. 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182) (alteration in original). 
 The Flores court also relied on “Congress’s apparent 
intent” to conclude that, because “a TPS beneficiary is a 
member of a class of people that Congress chose to protect,” 
courts should read § 1254a(f)(4) as satisfying § 1255’s 
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admission requirement. Id. And finally, the court considered 
policy considerations, saying “[the petitioner] seems to be the 
exact type of person that Congress would have in mind to allow 
adjustment of status,” id. at 555, and it was “disturbed by the 
Government’s incessant and injudicious opposition in cases 
like this,” id. at 556. 
We disagree with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation for 
three reasons. 
First, the court concluded § 1254a(f)(4) should be read 
as satisfying all of § 1255’s requirements. Id. at 553. But that 
conflates “lawful status” with “admission.” Even if § 1254a 
applies to all of § 1255, it does not follow that considering an 
alien to be in lawful status means he or she was admitted into 
the United States. As we explained already, status and 
admission are distinct—an alien can possess lawful status 
without ever having been admitted.  
Second, we find the court’s analysis of the “statutory 
scheme as a whole” and Congressional intent unpersuasive. 
TPS recipients’ exclusion from a list of aliens ineligible for 
discretionary relief has no bearing on whether they are excused 
from § 1255’s admission requirement. Moreover, the very 
nature of TPS—a program of temporary protection—
undermines the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress 
intended to waive § 1255’s admissibility requirement so TPS 
recipients could readily become permanent residents.  
Third, although the court claimed to be guided by the 
text of §§ 1254a and 1255, it betrayed its policy-driven 
approach at the outset of its opinion, stating: 
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This case illustrates the archaic and convoluted 
state of our current immigration system. While 
many suggest that immigrants should simply 
“get in line” and pursue a legal pathway to 
citizenship, for Saady Suazo and other similarly 
situated Temporary Protected Status 
beneficiaries, the Government proposes that 
there is simply no line available for them to join. 
Id. at 549.  
We express no opinion about the merits of this 
broadside against how the other branches of the federal 
government have handled immigration policy. If it’s true that 
our nation’s immigration system is “archaic” or “convoluted,” 
such criticism is no substitute for a careful evaluation of the 
statute’s text, context, and history. The court ended its opinion 
by saying it was “disturbed” by the Government’s position in 
the case and it considered Suazo—whom the court called a 
“contributing member of society”—“the exact type of person” 
that Congress would have wanted to be eligible for adjustment 
of status. Id. at 555–56. But a petitioner’s personal 
characteristics, however commendable they may be, are 
irrelevant to whether he or she has satisfied § 1255’s 
requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (requiring federal judges to 
“administer justice without respect to persons”). 
B 
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ramirez is similarly 
unpersuasive. As in Flores, the Ramirez court considered 
whether a TPS recipient who entered the United States without 
inspection or admission was eligible for adjustment of status 
by virtue of marrying an American citizen. 852 F.3d at 957. 
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The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit that an alien 
who is considered in lawful status under § 1254a(f)(4) should 
also be considered to have been admitted under § 1255(a). Id. 
at 959. To support this conclusion, the court cited several 
sections of the immigration code in which Congress discussed 
“admission” and “nonimmigrant” status together and held that 
“by the very nature of obtaining lawful nonimmigrant status, 
the alien goes through inspection and is deemed ‘admitted.’” 
Id. at 960. 
The court also emphasized similarities in the rigor of the 
admission and TPS application processes and concluded that 
an alien who receives TPS has also been admitted. Id. And 
although the court acknowledged its interpretation of §§ 1254a 
and 1255 does not align with the statutory definition of 
“admitted,” it cited Ninth Circuit caselaw allowing it to 
“‘embrace[] an alternative construction of the term’ when the 
statutory context so dictates.” Id. at 961 (quoting Negrete-
Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014)).  
The Ramirez court then turned to the structure of the 
statutory scheme to support its interpretation. First, it 
concluded that the title of § 1255—“Adjustment of status of 
nonimmigrant to that of person admitted for permanent 
residence”—shows that Congress intended TPS recipients to 
be able to “make use of § 1255.” Id. It then discussed 
§ 1254a(f)(4)’s applicability to § 1258(a), which provides that 
“[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security may . . . authorize a 
change from any nonimmigrant classification to any other 
nonimmigrant classification in the case of any alien lawfully 
admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant who is 
continuing to maintain that status.” Id. (alterations in original). 
The court concluded that § 1254a(f)(4) satisfies § 1255’s 
admission requirement because it “equates ‘being in . . . lawful 
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status as a nonimmigrant’ with § 1258(a)’s ‘lawfully 
admitted . . . as a nonimmigrant.’” Id. at 961–62 (alterations in 
original). It also opined that an alternative interpretation would 
limit § 1254a(f)(4)’s applicability to § 1255(c)(2) and “yield an 
anomalous result” by not benefitting immediate relatives of 
American citizens. Id. at 962. 
 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held its interpretation of 
§§ 1254a and 1255 is consistent with the purpose of TPS. Id. 
at 963. It explained: “Because TPS confers an actual status on 
and provides a slew of benefits to an alien who satisfies 
rigorous eligibility requirements, it is different than other 
forms of temporary reprieve we ordinarily would not consider 
sufficient for ‘admission.’” Id. And it reasoned that forcing 
TPS recipients to leave the United States, return to their 
homelands, then reenter with inspection and admission or 
parole, would undermine TPS’s purpose of protecting aliens 
from unsafe conditions in those countries. Id. at 964. 
 We disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Ramirez largely for the reasons we disagree with the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Flores. 
First, the court failed to acknowledge the meaningful 
differences between “status” and “admission” that we 
previously explained. And § 1254a(f)(4) is clear—aliens with 
TPS are granted only lawful status, they are not “admitted.” 
Moreover, the court overlooked distinctions between a 
conferral of TPS and an admission. For example, an alien at a 
port of entry may be subject to a full range of inadmissibility 
grounds that an applicant for TPS is not. Compare 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a) with 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2). 
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Second, the Ninth Circuit brushed off the statutory 
definition of “admission” because its own caselaw allowed it 
to “embrace[] an alternative construction of the term when the 
statutory context so dictates.” Ramirez, 852 F.3d at 961 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Our caselaw 
does not permit such a move. See Hanif, 694 F.3d at 485. 
Instead, we are bound to follow Congress’s definition in 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A), which defines admission as the physical 
event of entering the country. Taveras, 731 F.3d at 290. 
Third, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the structure of 
the immigration code is unpersuasive. The court said the title 
of § 1255 suggests Congress intended TPS recipients to be able 
to “make use” of its process for adjusting status. Ramirez, 852 
F.3d at 961. Fair enough. But § 1255 also establishes that 
adjustment of status is available only for TPS recipients 
lawfully admitted into the United States. The Ninth Circuit also 
reasoned that limiting § 1255 eligibility to TPS recipients 
lawfully admitted when they entered the United States would 
“yield an anomalous result” by not benefitting relatives of 
American citizens. Id. at 962. This rationale ignores the fact 
that TPS recipients who marry American citizens will be 
eligible for adjustment of status so long as they were inspected 
and admitted or paroled when they entered the United States. 
So our interpretation does not bar eligibility for TPS recipients 
who entered the country legally.5 
 
5 Nonimmigrants inspected and admitted or paroled 
when they entered the United States are eligible for TPS. See, 
e.g., Saliba v. Att’y Gen., 828 F.3d 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(nonimmigrant who lawfully entered the United States on a 
student visa applied for, and received, TPS); Mejia Rodriguez, 
562 F.3d at 1140 (same for nonimmigrant with B-2 visa). 
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Fourth, the court compared § 1254a to other sections of 
the immigration code and concluded that § 1254a(f)(4) 
“equates ‘being in . . . lawful status as a nonimmigrant’ with 
§ 1258(a)’s ‘lawfully admitted . . . as a nonimmigrant.’” Id. at 
961–62 (alterations in original). But that analysis again failed 
to recognize the difference between “status” and “admission.” 
Section 1258(a) applies to “any alien lawfully admitted to the 
United States as a nonimmigrant who is continuing to maintain 
that status.” (emphasis added). Nothing in § 1258(a) suggests 
that we should collapse the admission and status elements into 
a single requirement. Instead, § 1254a(f)(4) applies to 
§ 1258(a) (just like § 1255) to excuse only a lapse in lawful 
status following a lawful admission. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the purpose of 
TPS is contradictory. The court correctly noted that TPS 
“provides a limited, temporary form of relief.” Id. at 963 
(emphasis added). But then it interpreted § 1254a(f)(4) broadly 
to satisfy § 1255’s admission requirement. Id. Absent a clear 
statutory directive, a program that provides “limited, 
temporary” relief should not be read to facilitate permanent 
residence for aliens who entered the country illegally.  
The court reasoned further that forcing TPS recipients 
who entered illegally to leave the country and reenter lawfully 
before seeking adjustment of status would undermine the 
purpose of TPS. Id. at 964. According to the Ninth Circuit, this 
process would be particularly troubling for TPS recipients 
because their home countries are unsafe. Id. But that ignores 
the fact that TPS recipients may remain in the United States—
without seeking adjustment of status—as long as the Secretary 
of Homeland Security extends TPS for their homelands. 
Although they may be unable to adjust their status during that 
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time (if they entered the country illegally), they are free to 
remain in the United States with lawful nonimmigrant status.  
 For these reasons, we respectfully disagree with the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of the statute. We hold 
that Congress did not intend a grant of TPS to serve as an 
admission for those who entered the United States illegally.6 
V7 
We cannot square the District Court’s opinion with the 
text, context, structure, and purpose of §§ 1254a and 1255. For 
 
6 Our interpretation of §§ 1254a and 1255 is closely 
aligned with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Serrano v. Att’y 
Gen., 655 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). There, the 
petitioner argued he was exempt from § 1255(a)’s admission 
requirement because he had been granted TPS. 655 F.3d at 
1265. Although that argument is slightly different than the 
argument raised in this appeal (and in Flores and Ramirez), the 
court said: “That an alien with Temporary Protected Status has 
‘lawful status as a nonimmigrant’ for purposes of adjusting his 
status does not change § 1255(a)’s threshold requirement that 
he is eligible for adjustment of status only if he was initially 
inspected and admitted or paroled.” Id. That holding, like ours 
today, respects the distinction between status and admission 
and is faithful to the text of §§ 1254a and 1255. 
 
7 Sanchez and Gonzalez also argue they are eligible for 
adjustment of status under § 1255(k). That section provides an 
exception for aliens seeking to adjust status for employment 
purposes if, inter alia, the alien “on the date of filing an 
application for adjustment of status, is present in the United 
States pursuant to a lawful admission.” Because Sanchez and 
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the foregoing reasons, we hold that a grant of TPS does not 
constitute an “admission” into the United States under § 1255. 
We will reverse. 
 
Gonzalez were never admitted, they are ineligible for 
adjustment under § 1255(k). 
 
